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Balancing Interests at the Border: Protecting Our Nation
and Our Privacy In Border Searches of Electronic Devices
Carolyn Jamesf
Abstract
An analysis of the Department of Homeland Security's 2009
Directives on Border Searches of Electronic Media reveals the
difficulty in striking a balance between protecting government
interests in protecting the borders and preserving travelers' privacy
interests. The 2009 Directives take some steps towards reaching this
balance. They do not, however, adequately protect travelers'privacy
interests, especially when taking into account the vast amount of
personal information that electronic devices now carry. I make three
suggestions to better strike this delicate balance: (1) Border
officials should be required to have at least some reasonable
suspicion before searching an electronic device; (2) Congress should
require the DHS to conduct annual studies of their border searches,
report their findings to Congress, and annually issue updated and
concrete directives; and (3) Congress should require airlines to
better inform travelers of the broad authority that border officials
have in searching electronic devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The August 2009 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Directives on border searches of electronic devices and electronic
media add additional guidelines to existing DHS policies;' however,
t Carolyn James is a third-year law student at Santa Clara University
School of Law and serves as Senior Production Editor for the Santa
Clara Computer and High Tech Law Journal. She also holds a B.S. in
electrical engineering from Penn State University. She thanks
Professor Allen Hammond and the CHTLJ editors for their valuable
feedback on this article.
1. See generally Department of Homeland Security - Directives on Border Searches of
Electronic Media, http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1251484726779.shtm (last visited Aug. 1,
2010).
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officials continue to wield vast discretion to search any electronic
device at the border. Potential detection of terrorist activity and
confiscation of contraband are the goals behind the broad power
conferred upon border officials.2 While these policies are
unquestionably important, they are countered by strong privacy
interests. Laptops and other electronic media contain an immense
amount of information that is highly personal to the device's owner.
With the ability to recover even deleted and encrypted files, customs
officials have the keys to people's lives at their fingertips when they
conduct searches of electronic media.
Analysis of the 2009 DHS Directives, in context with the border
search doctrine, reveals the current imbalance between the
government's interest in protecting the borders and travelers' privacy
interests. What is needed to rebalance these interests is: (1) a
requirement that each border official have at least some reasonable
suspicion before searching an electronic device at the border; (2) a
requirement that the DHS conduct annual studies of their border
searches, report the findings to Congress, and annually issue updated
and more concrete directives; and (3) efforts to make travelers better
aware of border officials' broad authority to search electronic devices.
Electronic information does not need to cross the physical
"border" while stored in an electronic device to be transferred across
the border.4 Therefore, the rules regulating border searches of
electronic media should require at least some suspicion because
searches of electronic media within U.S. borders require a warrant. If
at least some suspicion is required, border searches will be more
efficient and travelers' privacy interests will be better protected.
Moreover, to reach the delicate balance between homeland
security concerns and privacy interests, Congress should pass
2. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Searches of Electronic Devices, § 4,
ICE Directive No. 7-6.1 (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice-border search electronic devices.pdf [hereinafter 2009
ICE Directive]; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Search of Electronic Devices
Containing Information, § 1, CBP Directive No. 3340-049 (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrarylassets/cbp directive_3340-049.pdf [hereinafter 2009 CBP
Directive).
3. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); see 2009 ICE
Directive, supra note 2, § 8.4; see 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.2.
4. See Ari B. Fontecchio, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search
Doctrine: The Fourth Amendment Exception That Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
231, 248 (2009).
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legislation requiring the DHS to conduct an annual study of their
searches and seizures. The report should include the types of searches
conducted; the circumstances of the searches; the results of each
search; and the race, gender, and national origin of travelers subject to
the searches. The findings should be reported to Congress and, based
on the study results, the DHS should be required to annually improve
and clarify the policies governing border searches of electronic
devices. The tailored policies and more frequent oversight would
ensure border officials have appropriate discretion to support the
Government's interests and would provide more specific regulations
to accommodate travelers' privacy interests.
Finally, travelers should be better warned of the DHS's broad
authority to conduct searches of electronic devices when making
plans to travel internationally. Congress should require airlines to give
notice to travelers of the DHS's authority during the ticket purchasing
process before the ticket is officially purchased, on the airline
website, and on the airline ticket itself. These are practical methods to
inform travelers and will allow travelers to take actions to protect
their privacy interests at the border.
II. BACKGROUND OF BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES
Under the Fourth Amendment,5 searches and seizures conducted
by government agents must be reasonable and supported by probable
cause. 6 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
require a warrant for searches and seizures with some circumstantial
exceptions.' The Court has explained that law enforcement practices
are "judged by 'balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.'" 8 However, there is a "border search"
exception that allows routine searches of persons and their belongings
at the U.S. borders without the requirement of reasonable suspicion,
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (grants "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
6. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER: "BORDER
SEARCHES" UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, CRS-RL31826 (2008).
7. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) ("warrantless search must be
'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation."' (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1986))).
8. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (quoting United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
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probable cause, or a warrant.9 While non-routine border searches of a
person require reasonable suspicion, these searches are limited to
those that are "highly intrusive."o Only physically intrusive searches
such as strip searches, body cavity searches, and x-ray searches of the
human body have been found "highly intrusive.""
The Ninth Circuit held that searches of electronic media,
including laptops, are routine searches; thus, such devices are
included in belongings that may be searched at the border without
reasonable suspicion.'2 Since international airports serve as functional
borders," passengers who enter or leave the country' 4 may have their
laptops and other forms of electronic media searched without
reasonable suspicion."
A. Travelers' Privacy Interests Implicated by Searches of
Electronic Media
Searches of electronic devices implicate important privacy and
dignity interests. 16 Searches of laptops and other forms of electronic
media are different from searches of a person's wallet or briefcase
because electronic media contains exponentially more information
than wallets or briefcases,1 and often contains information the owner
does not know is stored on the device.' 8 A search of a personal laptop
9. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (stating "[t]hat searches made at
the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of
the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.").
10. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 149 (2004).
11. United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e are satisfied that
reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal
electronic storage devices at the border."); see also Romm, 455 F.3d at 1006 (holding "ICE's
forensic analysis of Romm's laptop was permissible without probable cause or a warrant under
the border search doctrine.").
13. Romm, 455 F.3d at 996; see United States v. Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973)).
14. E.g., United States v. Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding border
search exception applies to items leaving as well as entering the country).
15. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
16. Joelle Hoffman, Reasonable Suspicion Should Be Required at a Minimum for
Customs Officials to Execute a Search of a Laptop at US. Borders. Why U.S. v. Arnold Got it
Wrong, 36 W. ST. U. L. REv. 173, 182 (2009).
1 7. Nathan Alexander Sales, Run For the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 1091, 1099-100 (2009) (citing Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory
Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 137, 144 (2008) "A modem-day 250-gigabyte hard
drive is capable of storing the equivalent of 125 million printed pages of text.").
18. See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531,
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and other electronic devices can reveal as much or more information
as a search of the person's home.19 One law professor described the
search of a laptop by a government agent as:
read[ing] your mind and everything you have thought over the last
year. What a laptop records is as personal as a diary but much
more extensive. It records every Web site you have searched.
Every e-mail you have sent. It's as if you're crossing the border
with your home in your suitcase. 20
Electronic devices carried internationally may contain personal
pictures, contact information for all of the owner's acquaintances,
years of sent and received e-mails, saved files containing years of
work, credit card information, passwords, and more.2 1
Many individuals traveling internationally who enter, depart, or
pass through the U.S. through international airports are unaware that
their laptops and other electronic devices may be searched.2 2 Even if
information is deleted or encrypted, the searches can recover the
deleted information23 and can unencrypt encrypted information.24
Therefore, travelers who wish to carry electronic media with them
into or out of U.S. borders are subject to the possibility of giving up
personal information to the U.S. Government that they did not know
was accessible from their electronic device.
B. The Government Has a "Paramount" Need to Protect U.S.
Borders from the Entrance of Terrorists and Contraband
The significant privacy concerns of travelers must be balanced
with the Government's "paramount" need to protect the U.S. from the
542 (2005).
19. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 181 (citing Brief for Amici Curiae Association of
Corporate Travel Executives and Electronic Frontier Foundation Supporting Defendant-Appelle
at 16, U.S. v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. CR 05-772-DDP)).
20. Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008,
at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/AR2008020604763.html.
21. See Sales, supra note 17, at 1100.
22. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 182 (citing Association of Corporate Traveler Executives
(A.C.T.E.) 2006 Survey where "only 13% of the 155 surveyed responses answered that they
were aware that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection may conduct a search of a laptop
computer's contents and hard drive as well as other electronic devices as part of its routine
search at the border.").
23. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1006.
24. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.4; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.2.
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entry of terrorists and contraband into the country.25 The government
also has a strong interest in searching outbound electronic devices to
enforce export control laws protecting sensitive technologies and to
prevent unwanted transmission of classified information.2 6
Laptops and other electronic devices are unique in that they
contain extraordinary storage capacity that can contain illegal
materials. The government has a strong interest in preventing the
distribution of child pornography and other "obscene" materials
stored on laptops passing through the U.S. borders.27 The DHS
describes border searches of electronic devices as "essential to
enforcing the law at the United States Border" and as a crucial tool in
detecting evidence relating to terrorism and other national security
matters, narcotics and human smuggling, alien admissibility,
contraband, and child pornography. 28 The searches can also reveal
information regarding violations of copyright, trademark, or export
control laws. 2 9 The DHS asserts that the "latest method" for
smuggling merchandise contrary to the law is through the use of
electronic materials.30
The DHS's broad authority to search electronic devices at the
border has facilitated detection of some terrorist activity and
discovery of child pornography. For example, a laptop search at
Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport in 2006 uncovered a laptop containing
information on how to make improvised explosive weapons, weapons
often used by terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq, and videos using the
weapons to kill soldiers and destroy vehicles. 3 1 Numerous border
searches of electronic devices have also uncovered child pornography
and evidence of child exploitation.32 In June 2008, the Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) bureau of the DHS released an article
25. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153, (2004) ("The Government's
interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the
international border."); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006; Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537.
26. Sales, supra note 17, at 1098.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); Sunil Bector, "Your
Laptop, Please:" The Search and Seizure of Electronic Devices at the United States Border, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 695, 709 (2009).
28. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 4; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 1.
29. Id.
30. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT CBP AND ICE BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypia-cbplaptop.pdf.
31. Sales, supra note 17, at 1096 (citing Remarks of Stewart Baker, Assistant Sec'y for
Policy, Dep't of Homeland Security, at the Ctr. For Strategic and Int'l Studies (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1 166557969765.shtm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009)).
32. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003; Ickes, 393 F.3d 501.
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declaring the importance of broad authority to conduct border
searches of electronic devices and gave examples of illegal activity
detected through the searches." These examples included three
incidents of terrorist activity, one example of an intellectual property
right violation, and one example of a search uncovering child
pornography.34 Thus, the strong government interests in preventing
terrorist activity and entrance of contraband information is facilitated
through border searches of electronic devices.
While the DHS has not disclosed the specific number of
suspicionless searches of electronic devices at the border, the number
of searches that uncover terrorist information or other illegal activity,
or the search methods used, 3 5 an October 2008 statement by Jayson
Ahern, Deputy Commissioner of the CBP, likely gives a fairly
accurate estimate of the success rate of laptop searches. In October
2008, Ahern revealed that of the 169 laptops searched at the border in
August 2008, only two were seized; a 1.4% success rate.36 Another
ten laptops were detained for further analysis such as decryption or
language translation. 37 Furthermore, the two seized laptops were not
seized for information stored within; one was outfitted to smuggle
drugs and the other was contraband itself.38 These figures are likely
representative of most border searches of electronic media, thus, only
a very small number of searched devices reveal information that the
DHS seeks to prevent from entering or exiting the country.
33. Jayson Ahern, CBP Laptop Searches, DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC. LEADERSHIP
JOURNAL ARCHIVE, June 30, 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/joumal/leadership/2008/06/cbp-laptop-
searches.html.
34. Id.
35. See Chloe Albanesius, How Many Laptops Have Been Searched at Customs?,
PCMAG.COM, June 11, 2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2348567,00.asp (citing
Letter from Catherine Crump, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union, to Mark Hanson,
FOIA Director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (June 10, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/freespeech/laptopfoia.pdf).
36. Greg Nojeim, Laptop Search Hit Rate: Only 1.4%, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECH., Oct. 30, 2008, http://blog.cdt.org/2008/10/30/laptop-search-hit-rate-only-14/.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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C. Previous Department ofHomeland Security Policies on
Border Searches ofElectronic Devices
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department
of Homeland Security and created the presidentially appointed
position of Secretary as the head of the Department.3 9 The Act also
created a Directorate of Border and Transportation Security headed
by an Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security. 40 The
United States Customs Service was transferred to the control of the
Secretary acting through the Under Secretary. 41 The Secretary is
responsible for "[p]reventing the entry of terrorists and the
instruments of terrorism into the United States," "[s]ecuring the
borders . . . [and] [e]stablishing and administering rules . . . ," and for
"ensuring the speedy, orderly, and efficient flow of lawful traffic and
commerce."42 As the Department of Homeland Security was taking
office, the Administration used the authority provided to the Secretary
to divide the Customs Service and the Bureau of Border Security. 43
The two new bureaus within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security are the Customs
and Border Protection and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE).44 Both bureaus have broad authority to conduct searches of
individuals crossing U.S. borders and share many of the same
functions; Congress has even held hearings to discuss whether the two
bureaus should be combined.45
In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security stopped requiring
any reasonable suspicion before border officials could conduct
searches of travelers' electronic devices.46 After a large public outcry
demanding the DHS be more transparent in its border searches, on
July 16, 2008, the CBP and the ICE made their respective policies
regarding searches of electronic devices public. 47 Both CBP Policy
39. See Bector, supra note 27, at 709.
40. Homeland Sec. Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
41. 6 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
42. 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
43. CBP and ICE: Does the Current Organizational Structure Best Serve U.S. Homeland
Security Interests?: Before the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight of the
Committee on Homeland Security House ofRepresentatives, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of
Mike Rogers, Chairman of Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 11.
46. Hoffman, supra note 16, at 178.
47. Id; see Bector, supra note 27, at 709.
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and the ICE Directive gave officials unlimited discretion to search
and retrieve files from any electronic device carried by passengers
entering the U.S., exiting the U.S., or even passing through the U.S. 4 8
In searching and reviewing detained or seized information, officials
were subject to the limitation that the searches be completed in a
"reasonable time."4 9 While the ICE Directive gave factors for ICE
Special Agents to consider in determining a reasonable time,so the
CBP Policy did not define a reasonable period of time.s5 Furthermore,
if officials encountered probable cause of any unlawful activity, both
policies allowed officials to seize and retain the originals or copies of
the electronic media. 52
Both the CBP Policy and the ICE Directive provided for return
of seized devices or destruction of copied information when no
probable cause was found, but did not give a time when the return or
destruction should occur.53 The CBP Directive provided some rules
for assistance of other federal agencies in searches, 54 and the ICE
Directive provided similar rules for assistance from federal and non-
55federal agencies.
D. Congress Recognized the Conflict Between Travelers'
Privacy Interests and the Government's Interest in Border
Searches ofElectronic Devices
The privacy interest at stake in the 2008 CBP Policy Regarding
Border Search of Information and the 2008 ICE Directive for Border
Searches of Documents and Electronic Media caught the attention of
many, including Congress. Four bills were drafted in 2008 and early
2009 that proposed solutions by imposing regulations on searches of
48. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Border Searches of Documents and
Electronic Media, § 5, ICE Directive No. 7-6.0 (July 16, 2008),
http://www.cdt.org/security/20080716_ICE%2OSearch%2OPolicy.pdf [hereinafter 2008 ICE
Directive]; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Policy Regarding Border Search of
Information, § A, B (July 16, 2008),
http://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/travel/admissibility/search-authority.ctt/search-authority.pdf
[hereinafter 2008 CBP Policy].
49. Ryan Singel, Border Laptop Searches? No Reason Needed, WIRED, Aug. 1, 2008,
http://www.wired.com/threattevel/2008/08/border-laptop-s/.
50. 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.3.
51. Bector, supra note 27, at 709.
52. 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.5; 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, § D.
53. See 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.1; 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, § C.
54. 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, § C(2).
55. 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.4; see Ellen Nakashima, Travelers' Laptops
May Be Detained At Border, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/01/AR2008080103030.html.
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electronic devices and media at the borders.
1. Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008
On July 23, 2008, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren introduced the
Electronic Device Privacy Act. 56 The Act prohibited any person
acting under the sovereign authority of the United States from
searching a laptop computer or similar electronic device at borders.5 7
The problem with this act was its great breadth. The act was
politically unfavorable because it did "not confer any authority to the
United States border officials to investigate non-routine scenarios
based on reasonable suspicion."58
2. Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008
On September 11, 2008, Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez
introduced the Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008.59
The Act required the Department of Homeland Security to issue rules
regarding border searches of electronic media. 6 0 The Act would
require these rules to provide that commercial information be handled
according to the laws, regulations, or rules governing such
information, and that searches be performed in the presence of the
official's supervisor and the traveler. 6' The Act would further require
proper lengths of time for retention of information and individual
notification if such information is put into a database. Individuals
subject to search would also receive receipt if a device is seized, and
an individual subject to border search would receive information
regarding how to report abuses or concerns related to the search.62
Furthermore, information on traveler's rights regarding border
searches would be required to be posted at all ports of entry, and both
a privacy impact assessment and a civil rights impact assessment of
the rules would be required.63 While this bill did not pass the 1 10
56. Encyclopedia.com, Rep. Lofgren Introduces Electronic Device Privacy Act,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/I P3-1519342851 .html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
57. Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
58. Bector, supra note 27, at 713.
59. Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. § 2
(2008).
60. Alice Lipowicz, House Bill Would Restrict Laptop Searches,
FEDERALCOMPUTERWEEK, July 22, 2009, http://www.fcw.com/Articles/2009/07/22/Sanchez-
bill-protects-laptops-at-borders.aspx.
61. H.R. 6869.
62. Id,
63. Id.
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Congress, it has been reintroduced in the 1 1 1th Congress.6
3. Travelers' Privacy Protection Act of 2008
In September 2008 Mr. Russ Feingold introduced the Travelers'
Privacy Protection Act of 2008.65 The Act incorporated many
elements of the previous acts and added more detail, but only covered
law abiding citizens and legal residents of the U.S. 66 The Travelers'
Privacy Protection Act of 2008 required reasonable suspicion to
search electronic devices, and either a warrant or an Order from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to seize an electronic
device.
The Act set specific procedures for the searches that included
requiring the details be recorded, permitting the resident to remain
present during the search, limiting the number of officials present to
two, and requiring the search be tailored to the reasonable suspicion
recorded prior to the search.
The Act also set forth specific procedures for seizures of
electronic devices after the initial search including when disclosure of
the information to other agencies is appropriate, when the information
should be destroyed, and when the resident should be provided with a
receipt, statement of rights, and contact information for appropriate
officials in the DHS.69
Additionally, the Act prohibited profiling in selecting residents
for searches, provides compensation measures for damages due to
search, and enables civil actions for violations of the bill.70
4. Securing Our Borders and Our Data Act of 2009
On January 7, 2009, Congressman Eliot Engel introduced the
Securing Our Borders and Our Data Act of 2009.71 The Act proposes
64. That's My Congress, http://thatsmycongress.com/index.php/2009/04/03/hr-1726-
border-laptop-seizure-regulation-sanchez/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
65. Press Release, Ass'n of Corporate Travel Executives, ACTE Calls for Industry
Support of Powerful New Bill That Guarantees Travelers' Rights in Laptop Seizures at U.S.
Borders (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.acte.org/resources/press release.php?id=359 (last visited
Dec. 17, 2009).
66. Travelers' Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S.3612, I10th Cong. § 2 (2008).
67. S. 3612; see Nojeim, supra note 36.
68. S. 3612; see Bector, supra note 27, at 715.
69. S.3612.
70. Bector, supra note 27, at 715.
71. US Fed. News Serv., Article: Rep. Engel Introduces Securing our Borders and our
Data Act, HIGH BEAM RESEARCH, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lP3-
1628329711 .html.
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that to search the contents of an individual's electronic device at the
U.S. border, the search must be based on reasonable suspicion of the
person.72 Also, the Act prohibits seizure of the device without
constitutional authority beyond the power of the United States to
search a person.73 Upon the traveler's request, the search is to be
made out of public view, and individuals may be required to turn on
electronic devices to demonstrate operation.74
Furthermore, the Act requires the Department of Homeland
Security to promulgate regulations on searches of electronic devices
including "policies for protecting the integrity of the data," "policies
for the length of time seized data will be stored and where and how it
will be stored," policies for sharing of downloaded information,
information regarding return of device or media, and a requirement
that a receipt be given to the traveler. The Act requires these
policies be posted on the Department of Homeland Security's
website.76
Additionally, the Act requires the United States Customs Service
to conduct an annual study of searches and seizures of the previous
year and report the findings to Congress annually.77 The study would
include "the digital contents of digital electronic devices and digital
storage media, and of seizures of such devices and media, that are
based on the power of the United States to search or seize a person
and that person's possessions upon entry into the United States." 78
The study would also include the number of such searches and
seizures; the types of searches conducted; the results of the searches;
and the race, gender, and national origin of the travelers subject to
those searches. 79
III. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S NEW DIRECTIVES
ANNOUNCED AUGUST 2009
After being sued by the American Civil Liberties Union in early
August 2009,so seeing the public's objections to the July 2008 CBP
72. KIM, supra note 6.
73. Securing Our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
74. H.R. 239.
75. Id.
76. Bector, supra note 27, at 714.
77. H.R. 239.
78. H.R. 239.
79. Bector, supra note 27, at 714.
80. Chloe Albanesius, ACLU Sues DHS over laptop searches, PCMAG.cOM, Aug. 26,
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Policy and to the July 2008 ICE Directive,81 and seeing Congress'
proposed legislation to regulate border searches of electronic devices
and electronic media, the DHS finally took action. On August 18,
2009, the DHS released new directives for the ICE,82 and on August
20, 2009, the DHS released new directives for the CBP. The new
Directives dictate the rules for searches conducted by the officials
under each department.84 They give more rules and standards to be
implemented than the 2008 rules and incorporate many ideas from the
proposed legislation. The new Directives, however, do not go far
enough to reach an appropriate balance between travelers' privacy
interests and the Government's interest in protecting our nation's
borders.
A. Analysis of the New Directives
1. Technology Covered, Supervision of Search, Traveler's
Right to be Present
Both new Directives cover "any device that may contain
information, such as computers, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones
and other communication devices, cameras, music and other media
players, and any other electronic or digital devices."86 Neither
Directive requires individualized suspicion to search electronic
devices.
Similar to the recommendations in the proposed legislation, the
2009 CBP Directive states that searches of electronic devices should
2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2352055,00.asp.
81. Richard Adhikari, Napolitano Urged to Act on Border Laptop Seizures,
INTERNETNEWS.COM, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.intenetnews.com/government/article.php/3800876/Napolitano%20Urged% 2 0to%20
Act%20on%20Border%2OLaptop%20Seizures.htm.
82. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2.
83. See 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
84. See generally 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
85. Id.
86. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 5.2; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 3.2; see
John Timmer, New DHS laptop search policy: crap sandwich, fancier bread, ARS TECHNICA,
Aug. 28, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/new-dhs-laptop-search-policy-
crap-sandwich-fancier-bread.ars.
87. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 6.1; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.1.2;
Chloe Albanesius, DHS Updates Rules on Border Laptop Searches, PCMAG.COM, Aug. 27,
2009, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2352137,00.asp.
88. Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th Cong. § 2(b)(2)
(2008).
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be conducted in the presence of a supervisor. 89 The ICE Directive
does not have a similar requirement.90
Unlike the 2008 CBP Policy and the 2008 ICE Directive, both
2009 Directives address what information the traveler should be given
regarding the search and the presence of the traveler during the
search. 91 The CBP Directive states that the searches should be
conducted in the "presence" of the traveler unless there is a "national
security, law enforcement, or other operational consideration" that
makes the traveler's presence inappropriate. 92 The CBP Directive
then goes on to state that the traveler may be notified if a search is
conducted, the purpose of the search, the authority for the search, and
ways to find information on reporting concerns and redress if
aggrieved by the search only if "the fact of conducting this search can
be disclosed to the individual transporting the device without
hampering national security or law enforcement or other operational
considerations." 93 Similarly, the ICE Directive states, "[t]o the extent
practicable, border searches should be conducted in the presence of,
or with the knowledge of, the traveler." 9 4 "Not practicable" is
described as times when there are law enforcement, national security,
or other operational concerns.95
Thus, the Directives provide that the traveler be notified of a
search of his electronic device and possibly even be present for the
search as long as a national security, law enforcement or operational
concern is not identified. 9 6 This is an expansive exception that can be
fulfilled by many excuses; for example an "operational concern"
exception can encompass a situation where officials do not have time
to notify the traveler of the search because they were rushed to change
89. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.1.3; Alice Lipowicz, DHS Sets New Policy on
Computer Searches at Border, FEDERALCOMPUTERWEEK, Aug. 28, 2009,
http://www.fcw.com/Articles/2009/08/28/DHS-sets-new-policy-on-computer-searches-at-
border.aspx.
90. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2.
91. Compare 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2; 2008
ICE Directive, supra note 48; 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48.
92. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.1.4; John Timmer, New DHS laptop search
policy: crap sandwich, fancier bread, ARS TECHNICA, Aug. 28, 2009,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/new-dhs-laptop-search-policy-crap-sandwich-
fancier-bread.ars.
93. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.1.3.
94. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.1(2).
95. Id.
96. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
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shifts.97
Even if the traveler is permitted to be present for the search of
his device, both Directives state that permitting the traveler to be
present for the search does not mean that the traveler may witness the
search itself, if witnessing "could reveal law enforcement techniques,
or potentially compromise other operational considerations."9 Again,
this exception is extremely broad. "Law enforcement techniques" and
"other operational considerations" can encompass nearly any excuse
given by a DHS official. A law enforcement technique can include
which files on travelers' devices officials examine first. Thus, a
traveler permitted to be "present" for the search will likely not know
exactly what information was searched because "witnessing" the
search may "reveal law enforcement techniques or compromise other
operational considerations."
2. Detention of Electronic Device or Copies Thereof
Under both new Directives, officials may detain electronic
devices or copies of electronic media for a "reasonable" time in order
to complete a thorough search. 99 Unlike the July 2008 CBP Policy
and the 2008 ICE Directive, the new Directives provide a maximum
amount of time that devices or copies of information can be detained
before extensions are required.100 The CBP Directive states that such
detention should not exceed five days. 01 The ICE Directive states
that such detention should not exceed thirty days. 102  There is a
significant difference in limits for "reasonable" lengths of searches
under the two Directives, with no explanation as to why reasonable
searches are limited to five days for the CBP and thirty days for the
ICE. While the ICE has a longer time period allocated for searches
before approval is required, the 2009 Directive, like the 2008 ICE
Directive, lists factors to help determine a reasonable time for
detention and completion of the search.10 3 The CBP Directive does
97. See id.
98. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.1.4; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, §
8.1(2); see Albanesius, supra note 87.
99. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.1; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, §
8.3(1); Susan Brenner, New Border Search Directives, CYB3RCRIM3, Aug. 31, 2009,
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/08/new-border-search-directives.html.
100. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2; see 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
101. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.1.1; Timmer, supra note 92.
102. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.3(1); Ellen Nakashima, Bush's Search Policy
for Travelers Is Kept, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/27/AR2009082704065.html.
103. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.3(3); 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, §
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not include any factors to determine the length of a reasonable
search. 104
The 2009 Directives also set forth more specific requirements for
approval of detention extensions. Extensions under both Directives
can be obtained with approval. 10 Under the ICE Directive, extensions
can be granted in increments of fifteen days. 10 6 The CBP Directive
allows extensions beyond five days but requires further approval to
extend the search past fifteen days. 107
The limits on the duration of searches are additions from the
2008 CBP Policy and the 2008 ICE Directive.108 While the limits
provide more concrete regulation of officials conducting searches and
effectively limit the discretion of individual officials, the time periods
of five days (in the case of CBP officials) and thirty days (in the case
of ICE officials) with the ability to extend upon necessary approval
still yield vast discretion to officials in border searches of electronic
devices.109 The ICE Directive provides officials a much longer time
for searches and allows for longer extensions than the CBP
Directive.110 Both 2009 Directives state that "[w]hen CBP detains,
seizes, or retains electronic devices, or copies of information
therefrom, and turns such over to ICE for analysis and
investigation. . . , ICE policy will apply once it is received by
ICE.""' Therefore, the more liberal ICE policies apply to searches
conducted by the CBP when the CBP turns the devices or copied
information over to the ICE for analysis and investigation. 1 12 The
Directives state that the ICE and the CBP have "concurrently-held
border search authority," 1 3  indicating that no individualized
suspicion is required before the CBP can send the ICE detained,
seized, or retained information.
Furthermore, travelers may not be aware that their electronic
information was copied and the search continued if their device is
8.3(3).
104. See 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
105. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.3(1); 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, §
5.3.1.1.
106. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.3(l).
107. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.1.1; Timmer, supra note 92.
108. See Nakashima, supra note 102; compare 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48; 2008
CBP Policy, supra note 48.
109. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2; see 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2.
110. See id.
111. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 6.2.
112. See id.
113. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7.
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returned. The DHS Privacy Impact Assessment of the 2009 Directives
explains, "[t]here is no specific receipt given to the traveler if the
contents of the device are detained for further review, but the device
is returned to the individual."' 
1 4
Depending on which bureau is conducting the search,
supervisory approval may or may not be required before such a copy
is made.'15 The Privacy Impact Assessment explains times when
copying information from a device without the knowledge of the
traveler may be appropriate:
Copying may take place where CBP or ICE does not want to alert
the traveler that he is under investigation; where facilities, lack of
training, or other circumstances prevent CBP or ICE from
performing the search at secondary inspection; or where the
traveler is unwilling or is unable to assist, or it is not prudent to
allow the traveler to assist in the search (such as providing a
password to log on to a laptop). 116
Thus, copies of information on electronic devices can be made
without the traveler's knowledge and the search continued, as long as
the original device itself is returned to the traveler.
3. Assistance from Other Agencies
Like the July 2008 CBP Policy, the CBP Directive allows other
federal agencies to assist with technical difficulties presented in a
search, foreign language difficulties, and encryption issues, including
decrypting passwords or otherwise not readily reviewable material
without any requirement of reasonable suspicion." 7 Thus, the
electronic device or copies of the information within can be sent to
other federal agencies with or without reasonable suspicion. efore
subject matter assistance may be requested from another federal
agency, both the 2008 CBP Policy and the 2009 CBP Directive
114. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Privacy Impact Assessment CBP and ICE Border Searches
of Elec. Devices (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypia cbp laptop.pdf.
115. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.1.1; see 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2
(While the 2009 CBP Directive provides that CBP officials must have supervisory approval to
make copies, the ICE Directive does not have a similar requirement).
116. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Privacy Impact Assessment CBP and ICE Border Searches
of Elec. Devices (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypia-cbplaptop.pdf
117. See 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.2; 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, §
C(2)(a); see Susan Brenner, New Border Search Directives, CYB3RCRIM3, Aug. 31, 2009,
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/08/new-border-search-directives.html.
118. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.2.
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require that CBP Officers "have reasonable suspicion of activities in
violation of the laws enforced by the CBP."119
The 2009 ICE Directive, like the July 2008 ICE Directive,
allows assistance from even non-federal agencies in translation,
decryption, and other technical assistance with or without reasonable
suspicion.120 Assistance from federal and non-federal agencies may
also be requested for subject matter assistance if ICE Special Agents
have reasonable suspicion of activities in violation of the laws
enforced by the ICE.12 1 As discussed above, since the CBP can send
information to the ICE and then ICE policy will apply to the search,
the CBP can send detained traveler information to the ICE and then
the ICE can send the information to non-federal agencies.122
4. Destruction of Copied Information from Electronic
Devices
Both the 2008 CBP Policy and the 2009 CBP Directive require
destruction of copies if there was no probable cause to seize the
electronic media and return of the device.123 The 2009 CBP Directive
states that such information should be destroyed no later than seven
days after the determination that there was no probable cause to seize,
and unless circumstances require additional time not to exceed
twenty-one days. 124
The ICE Directive gives seven business days for destruction of
copied information from electronic devices after the determination
that the information is "of no relevance to ICE."'12 5 What is of no
relevance to the ICE is not elaborated upon.
5. Retention and Seizure with Probable Cause
The July 2008 CBP Policy, the July 2008 ICE Directive, and the
2009 ICE Directive all allow seizure and retention of the electronic
device or copy of information thereof if there is "probable cause of
119. See 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.3; 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, §
C(2)(b); see Albanesius, supra note 80.
120. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 24, § 8.4(1); 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, §
8.4(1); see Timmer, supra note 92.
121. 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.4(2); see 2009 ICE Directive supra note 2, §
8.4(2).
122. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 6.2.
123. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, §§ 5.3.1.2, 5.4.1.6; 2008 CBP Policy supra note
48, § C(1).
124. Albanesius, supra note 80.
125. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(e).
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unlawful activity-based on a review of information in the electronic
devices or on other facts and circumstances .... ,126 In contrast, the
2009 CBP Directive allows retention of an electronic device or copies
thereof only when there is probable cause to believe the device or
copied information "contains evidence of or is the fruit of a crime that
the CBP is authorized to enforce."l 27 Thus, under the 2009 ICE
Directive, if after searching a traveler's electronic device the official
has probable cause of any unlawful activity, the device may be seized
and retained.12 8 As discussed above, even though the CBP may not
have authority to seize a device, a CBP official can send the device or
copy of electronic information to an ICE official who can then, under
its policy, seize the device for probable cause of any unlawful
activity.129
Once seized or retained, both the 2008 and 2009 Directives
allow sharing of the information in accordance with applicable law
and policy. 130 Thus, under the 2009 ICE Directive, the ICE can seize
or retain any device or copy of information with probable cause that
the information contains or concerns any unlawful activity and then
share that information with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies in compliance with applicable laws.
6. Safeguarding Data During Storage and Transmission
Both new Directives, unlike the July 2008 CBP Policy, provide
that the retained, copied, or seized information from electronic
devices will be kept safe, and its locations documented.13 ' Both new
Directives also require any suspected loss or compromise of
information to be reported to a specified authority immediately.132
126. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(a); 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 2, §
D(1)(a); 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(a); see also John Timmer, supra note 92.
127. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.4.1.1.
128. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(a).
129. See 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7; see 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, §
6.2.
130. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(c); 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, §
5.4.1.3; 2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.5(1)(c); 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, §
D(1)(c).
131. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(d); 2009 CBP Directive supra note 24, §
5.4.1.5; see Alice Lipowicz, DHS Sets New Policy on Computer Searches at Border,
FEDERALCOMPUTERWEEK, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.fcw.com/Articles/2009/08/28/DHS-sets-
new-policy-on-computer-searches-at-border.aspx.
132. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.5(1)(d); 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, §
5.4.1.5.
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7. Privileged or Other Sensitive Materials
Both 2009 Directives as well as the 2008 CBP Policy and 2008
ICE Directive provide special provisions for sensitive information
such as information that is attorney-client or attorney work-product
privileged, medical records, information carried by journalists,
business or commercial information, and other information protected
by law. 133
These provisions likely do not adequately protect all privileged
or other sensitive materials crossing the border. Both 2009 Directives
add a provision that if officials suspect legal documents or those
claimed to be attorney-client privileged "constitute evidence of a
crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the jurisdiction"
of the bureau searching (either the CBP or the ICE), then advice from
the appropriate office must be sought. 13 4 This provision likely does
not guarantee protection of attorney-client privilege. Furthermore,
U.S. domestic and international corporations and businesses send
employees across its borders daily. The provisions in the 2009
Directives likely do not adequately protect the privileged information
that is stored within the devices of those business travelers.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS AND TRAVELERS' PRIVACY
INTERESTS AT THE BORDER
While the new Directives are an improvement over the past
policies, they are largely the same as past policies135 and do not strike
the DHS's claimed "balance between respecting civil liberties and
133. See 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.6; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.2;
2008 ICE Directive, supra note 48, § 8.7; 2008 CBP Policy, supra note 48, § E; see also
Albanesius, supra note 80.
134. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.6(2)(b) (stating "[i]f Special Agents suspect
that the content of such a document may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a
determination within the jurisdiction of ICE, the ICE Office of the Chief Counsel or the
appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office must be contacted before beginning or continuing a search of
the document and this consultation shall be noted in appropriate ICE systems."); 2009 CBP
Directive, supra note 2, § 5.2.1 (stating "[i]f an Officer suspects that the content of such a
material may constitute evidence of a crime or otherwise pertain to a determination within the
jurisdiction of CBP, the Officer must seek advice from the CBP Associate/Assistant Chief
Counsel before conducting a search of the material, and this consultation shall be noted in
appropriate CBP systems of records. CBP counsel will coordinate with the U.S. Attorney's
Office as appropriate.").
135. See Associated Press, Gov't Tightens Oversight of Laptop Border Searches,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Aug. 28, 2009,
http://www.eff.org/press/mentions/2009/8/28-0 (quoting Marcia Hoffman, lawyer for Electronic
Frontier Foundation).
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privacy of all travelers while ensuring that the DHS can take the
lawful actions necessary to secure our borders."1
36
One of the biggest problems with both the 2008 and 2009
versions of the DHS Directives is that they are written with
ambiguous terms leaving travelers confused about what to expect
when crossing the U.S. border with electronic devices or electronic
media. For example, travelers may or may not have their electronic
devices searched depending on the whim of an ICE or CBP official.
Travelers subjected to a search of their electronic device may or may
not be able to watch or even be present for the search, their
information may or may not be copied and retained and even sent to
other federal or non-federal agencies, and their electronic device or
media may be seized upon probable cause of unlawful activity
depending on which bureau conducted the search. While these
ambiguities leave travelers feeling somewhat helpless, they also work
to protect U.S. borders from terrorists and contraband. Rules
regulating border searches need to reach a better balance between the
government's interest in protecting the borders and traveler's privacy
interests.
A. Reasonable Suspicion Should be Required
There is a valid argument that because electronic data does not
need to cross the border through a physical device to be transmitted
inside, outside, or to pass through the country, there is no special need
for the government to search such information at the border.' 37 This
argument reasons that data can be electronically transmitted and
received between the United States and other countries through e-
mail, internet-postings, etc.; thus, any right that the government has to
search your laptop for such information at the U.S. border is the same
right that it has to search your laptop while located anywhere inside
the country.138 Because suspicion is required for searches of
136. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces New Directives on
Border Searches of Electronic Media,
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr 1251393255852.shtm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
137. Erwin Chemerinsky, Laptop Search at Border Was Illegal, Los Angeles Daily
Journal, Nov. 29, 2006, at 6 (reasoning that:
The government has no special interest at the border in searching a person's
computer different from computers that are already in the country. The
government is allowed to engage in suspicionless border searches where there is
an interest unique to the border, such as preventing people from entering illegally
or in intercepting drugs or weapons being brought into the country. But these
interests do not exist with regard to the memory of computers.).
138. Fontecchio, supra note 4, at 231, 255-57.
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electronic devices when the person is inside the country, and a
person's privacy interest is the same while inside the country as at the
border, it is logical that reasonable suspicion be required for searches
of electronic devices at the border.13 9
Furthermore, searches of electronic devices at the border
monopolize valuable time of ICE Special Agents and CBP
Officials.14 0 Searches of electronic devices are lengthy because the
official must first initiate the search, and if the official is a CBP agent,
then this official must obtain supervisor approval.14 1 The official must
then turn on the device and complete a thorough search while
following the required recording, searching, and documenting
protocols.14 2 This procedure is an especially inefficient allocation of
resources when the search is without any reasonable suspicion, and
other travelers are passing through border checkpoints with less
scrutiny.143
Additionally, great discretion in the hands of border officials
leads to profiling. If reasonable suspicion is not required to conduct
border searches of electronic media, the decision regarding whose
devices to search is left to the whims of individual officials, and
searches may fall on people they decide look untrustworthy. Such
whims can include various profiling reasons, the official's personal
interest, or even to harass a difficult traveler.14 4 Reasonable suspicion,
or "one good reason" as proposed by one scholar, should be required
to at least limit searches from being conducted for illegitimate and
profiling reasons.145
B. Congress Should Require the DHS to Conduct an Annual
Study of the Searches, Report the Results to Congress, and
Promulgate New, More Definite, Directives Based on the
Findings
I propose that Congress require the DHS to conduct an annual
study and report the findings to Congress, similar to the study
requirement proposed in the Securing Our Borders and Our Data Act
139. Id. at 255.
140. See Fontecchio, supra note 4, at 248.
141. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, §5.1.3.
142. See DEP'T. HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT CBP AND ICE BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_piacbp_1aptop.pdf
143. Fontecchio, supra note 4, at 251-52.
144. Id. at 254.
145. Id. at 264-265.
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of 2009.146 The study should include the number of searches
conducted, what devices and electronic media were searched, how
long the searches took, how often the official's supervisor was in the
room, how often travelers were permitted to be present during the
search, how often travelers were permitted to witness the search,
which officials were present for the search, how many devices and
copies of electronic media were detained, when passwords were
decrypted, techniques used to search, if a federal or non-federal
agency assisted in the search, how many devices or copies of
electronic information were seized, as well as the race, gender, and
national origin of the travelers subject to those searches. The study
should also include the overall result of the search, mainly whether
unlawful activity was prevented and the type of unlawful activity
prevented.
The DHS should then be required to annually update and reissue
the Directives based on the results of the study. Through annual
analysis of the searches of electronic devices and electronic media,
the DHS will remain acutely aware of the realities of the searches and
the privacy interests at stake. Congress and the DHS should be able to
tailor the amount of discretion in the hands of border officials to
sufficiently meet the government's interest while also accommodating
travelers' privacy interests. Furthermore, the yearly report to
Congress will hold the DHS responsible for any abuses in conducting
border searches of electronic media and will allow Congress to take
action if it believes the DHS Directives are insufficient or
inappropriate.
Analysis of the annual studies should reveal whether it is ever
appropriate for travelers to witness the searches; or in the case that
they do witness the searches, which "law enforcement techniques" or
"other operational considerations" should be sufficient to prevent
them from witnessing the search. The annual studies may also reveal
what electronic devices are most commonly used for transporting
illegal information, and should therefore be searched most often.
Comparison of the ICE and CBP study results may reveal whether the
presence of the official's supervisor during the search is preferable,
whether the ICE reasonableness factors should be incorporated into
the CBP's policies, and whether allowing electronic information to be
sent to non-federal agencies for either technical or subject matter
146. Securing Our Borders and our Data Act of 2009, H.R. 239, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
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assistance is desirable.
The CBP and ICE policies should evolve to be more similar
because the two bureaus have "concurrently-held border search
authority," 147 conduct similar searches,148 and the CBP can send any
detained device or copy of information to the ICE and the ICE
policies will then apply. 149 Annual updating and refining of the
directives should facilitate the evolution of directives with less
discrepancy between the appropriate time for searches of electronic
information and approval requirements for extensions between the
two bureaus. The time regulations should be tailored to accurately
reflect the actual reasonable time required by the ICE and CBP to
conduct thorough searches. Continuous refining will allow the
directives to reach an appropriate balance between the government's
interest in conducting border searches of electronic devices and
travelers' privacy interests.
C. Travelers Should Be Better Warned of the Great Discretion
Afforded Border Search Officials Before They Get to the
Airport
Most travelers are unaware when they travel internationally
through U.S. borders that their electronic devices may be searched,
detained for numerous days, and even sent to other federal agencies
without any individualized suspicion of unlawful activity. Most
travelers are also unaware that if an ICE official has probable cause of
any unlawful activity on an electronic device, the device may be
seized.150 If border officials are to have such great discretion in
searching electronic media at the borders, then the government should
make travelers better aware of the policies regarding border searches
of electronic devices.
Provisions to put the public on notice of the Department of
Homeland Security's broad authority to search electronic devices at
the borders are limited to: the Directives posted on the DHS website,
signs posted at the entrance of port areas, various Systems of Record
Notice (SORNs) published in the Federal Register regarding retention
information from travelers' electronic devices at the border, and "tear
sheets" provided when devices are detained or seized."' While the
147. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7.
148. See generally 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2.
149. 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 2.7; 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 6.2.
150. See Hoffman, supra note 16, at 182.
151. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Privacy Impact Assessment CBP and ICE Border Searches
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Directives themselves are posted on the DHS website to notify
travelers of the DHS's broad authority to search electronic devices,
most travelers do not know to look at the website because they have
no idea that such searches are possible.
The DHS's Privacy Impact Assessment explains that the CBP is
working to amend signs at the entrance of port areas "to state
explicitly that electronic devices are subject to detention and search,
and to include a Privacy Act Statement providing notice of DHS's
authority to collect information from electronic devices."152 The
SORNs published in the Federal Register provide information about
the types of records maintained, 153 information about seizures, fines,
penalties, etc., 154  and information about seized or detained
information. 155
The Privacy Impact Assessment also explains that a "tear sheet"
will be given to travelers whose devices are detained or seized, the
sheet "containing information concerning the CBP/DHS's authority to
perform its search, detention, and possible seizure."5 6 While the
signs, Directives posted on the D.H.S website, SORNs published in
the Federal Register, and the tear sheets aid in informing travelers of
the DHS's broad authority, they do not adequately warn travelers
before travelers depart for the airport to travel internationally.
To give travelers better notice, Congress should require airlines
to post notices describing the DHS's authority to search electronic
devices at the border within the airline ticket purchasing process
before a ticket is purchased, on the airline ticket itself, and on the
airline's website. Many travelers glance through the notices presented
when purchasing airline tickets, visit the airline website while packing
for their trip (to check what may or may not be brought in carry-on
luggage, etc.), and look over their airline tickets. These notices should
inform travelers of the possibility that their electronic devices may be
searched without individualized suspicion, detained for numerous
days, sent to other federal agencies and possibly non-federal agencies,
and even seized if an official has probable cause of any illegal
activity, including trademark and copyright violations. The notices
of Elec. Devices (2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-Piacbp laptop.pdf.
152. Id.
153. See System of Records Notice, 73 Fed. Reg. 77778 (Dec. 19, 2008).
154. See Seized Assets and Case Tracking System, 73 Fed. Reg. 77764 (Dec. 19, 2008).
155. See Search, Arrest, and Seizure Records, 73 Fed. Reg. 74732 (Dec. 9, 2008).
156. Dep't Homeland Sec., Privacy Impact Assessment CBP and ICE Border Searches of
Elec. Devices (2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypia cbp_1aptop.pdf.
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should also explain that the DHS can recover deleted files' 7 and
unencrypt encrypted files.158 If travelers are aware of the DHS's
power to search their electronic devices and electronic media, they
can take steps to safeguard their own privacy interests before leaving
for the airport to travel internationally.
V. CONCLUSION
The "border search" exception to the Fourth Amendment holds
"routine searches" as reasonable and thus requires no individualized
suspicion. As courts currently deem searches of electronic devices to
be "routine," such searches do not require individualized suspicion.
These searches implicate travelers' privacy interests because
electronic devices contain immense amounts of highly personal and
private information. The Department of Homeland Security's August
2009 Directives on border searches of electronic devices and
electronic media impose more regulations on these searches than past
policies, but are still vague and contain wide exceptions. Analysis of
these Directives indicates that the DHS has yet to reach an adequate
balance between the government's interest in conducting border
searches of electronic devices and traveler's privacy interests.
To reach an adequate balance, at least some reasonable suspicion
should be required before an electronic device is searched at the
border. Since electronic information can be sent into and out of the
country without being physically carried across the border in a device,
there is no special need for the government to search such information
at the border. Furthermore, requiring at least some suspicion will
allow border officials to more efficiently allocate their time, and will
prevent searches from being conducted for improper reasons.
To balance national security interests with the privacy interests
of travelers, Congress should require the DHS to conduct an annual
study of its searches, report the results to Congress, and issue refined
directives based on the results of the study. The continual refining of
the directives will allow the rules regarding searches of electronic
media to change with the changing technology and to be tailored to
protect privacy interests while leaving the officials discretion to
protect homeland security.
Finally, Congress should require airlines to put notice of the
DHS's broad authority to conduct searches of electronic devices
157. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d at 1006.
158. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 2, § 8.4; 2009 CBP Directive, supra note 2, § 5.3.2.2.
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within their ticket-purchasing process, on their websites, and on the
airline tickets themselves. This measure will better ensure that
travelers are aware of the DHS's authority to search their electronic
devices at the border and allow travelers to take adequate steps to
protect their privacy interests.
*
